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Abstract 
We provide evidence on the fit of the New Phillips Curve (NPC) for the Euro 
area over the period 1970-1998, and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics 
of European inflation dynamics with those observed in the U.S. We also analyze the 
factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal 
costs, as well as that of its two main components, namely, labor productivity and real 
wages. Some of the findings can be summarized as follows: (a) the NPC fits Euro 
area data very well, possibly better than U.S. data, (b) the degree of price stickiness 
implied by the estimates is substantial, but in line with survey evidence and U.S. 
estimates, (c) inflation dynamics in the Eure area appear to have a stronger forward­
looking component (i.e., less inertia) than in the U.S., (d) labor market frictions, as 
manifested in the behavior of the wage markup, appear to have played a key role in 
shaping the behavior of marginal costs and, consequenty, inflation in Europe. 

1 Introduction 
Over the postwar, the pattern of inflation in the countries that now constitute the 
Il;ew Euro area has been broadly similar to that in many other industrialized nations, 
including the United States, England and Japan. The issue of Euro area inflation, 
however, is of distinct interest given the formation of the new European Central 
Bank (ECB). The explicit mission of the ECB is the preservation of price stability. 
To this end, analysis of the sources and nature of inflation in the Euro area is a rather 
immediate and central task. 
In this spirit, we propose and estimate a simple theory-based Phillips curve for the 
new EUIO area.} We make use of a newly constructed aggregate historical data set for 
this region. In addition, given our approach, we also necessarily confront the debate 
over whether recent structural models of inflation - loosely know as "new Phillips 
curves" - can explain the data, particularly the high degree persistence in inflation. 
At issue is the nature of short run inflation dynamics and the associated implications 
for monetary policy.2 
The structural equation for inflation that we estimate for the Euro area is in the 
spirit of the new Phillips curve literature.3 It evolves explicitly from a setting 6f 
staggered nominal price setting by monopolistically competitive firms. 'This formula:.. 
tion has inflation vary positively with real sector economic activity in the short run, 
similar in spirit to a traditional Phillips curve. One key difference is that� in its prim­
itive form, the new Phillips curve relates inflation to movements in real marginal cost 
(averaged across firms). That is, real marginal cost is the theoretically appropriate 
measure of real sector inflationary pressures; as opposed to the cyclical'.measures used 
in traditional Phillips curve analysis, such as detrended output or. lU1employment. 
Recently, Sbordone (1999) and Galf and Gertler (1999) (hereafter GG) have shown 
that this "marginal cost-based" version of the new Phillips curve can provide a rea­
sonable acCOlU1t of postwar inflation in the U.S .. 4 In this paper we show that the same 
is largely true for the Euro area. That is conditional on the path of real ma:r;-ginal'cost, 
the structural equation captures the pattern of Euro area inflation, including the rise 
to double digit levels in the 1970s, the disinflation of the 1980s, as well as the current 
era of relative price stability. A "Virtue of the real marginal cost measure, which in 
I Coenen and Wieland (2000) also analyze the new Euto area inflation data, .usin·g a somewhat 
different approach. 
20n this debate, among others, see Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Roberts (1997), Sbordone (1999), 
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Mankiw (2000). 
3See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a survey. 
-tSpecifically, these authors obtain sensible and similar estimates of marginal cost based new 
Phillips curve using different methologies. Though GG reject the pure forward looking model in 
favor of a hybrid specification in the spirit of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) that allows for .a fraction of 
firms to use rule of thumb pricing, they nonetheless find that the forward looking behavior suggested. 
by the baseline theory remains predominant (see section 4.) Further, Sbor4one (1999) fi�ds that· the 
pure baseline model does a good job of tracking the aggregate data, while GG find that a hybird 
version with a modest amount of backward looking behavior does the job. 
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our analysis corresponds to real unit labor costs, is that it directly accounts for the 
influence of both productivity and wage pressures on inflation. In this respect, we 
find that productivity, wages and inflation move together largely as the new Phillips 
curve theory suggests. 
An auxiliary finding is that, as with the U.S. data, real marginal cost in the 
Euro area is not well approximated by detrended output. This finding is of some 
sigi"uficance: It suggests that at least part of the explanation for the empirical failure 
of specifications of the new Phillips curve based on detrended output. Put differently, 
much of the recent criticism of the new Phillips curve applies to this formulation, and 
not to the marginal cost-based specification. Among other things, real marginal cost 
appears to move more sluggishly in the data relative to detrended output. This 
sluggishness in real marginal cost, in turn, appears to help the model account for the 
high degree of persistence in inflation. 
In part, our results push the mystery of inflation back to understanding the factors 
that underlie the apparent inertia in the real marginal cost. Given the link between 
unit labor costs and marginal cost, wage rigidity arises as a possibility. We pursue that 
hypothesis by presenting a decomposition of the cyclical movement in real marginal 
cost. We find that for both Euro area and the U.S., wage rigidity was indeed a 
significant factor in accounting for sluggish cyclical movement in marginal cost. In 
addition, for the Euro area alone, steady real wage increases from the early 1970s 
through the early 1980s-possibly emanating from union pressures- placed consistent 
upward pressure on real marginal cost. This persistent supply shock (in conjunction 
with accommodating European central banks) likely played a key role in the double­
digit inflation and general stagnation in Europe at this time. 
In section 2 we provide a background discussion of the debate over use of old 
versus new Phillips curves in the context of the Euro area. Section 3 develops the 
theoretical model used for estimation. In addition to the pure forward looking model, 
we also consider a hybrid model in the spirit of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Gali 
and Gertler (1999) that allows a fraction of firms to be backward locking. Section 
4 discusses some econometric issues and then presents empirical results for the Euro 
area, and draws a comparison for the U.S.. Among other things, we show that 
the estimated baseline model tracks actual Euro inflation very well. In section 5, 
we present a simple decomposition of real marginal cost in order to understand the 
forces that have driven this variable. We show that labor market frictions likely have 
played an important role in the Euro area both at the medium and highly frequencies 
in a way that is compatible with the anecdotal evidence. Concluding remarks are in 
section 6. 
2 Eu�o Inflation and the Phillips Curve Debate 
We first analyze European inflation from the perspective of the traditional Phillips 
curve, partly to provide some descriptive evidence and partly to motivate use of the 
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new Phillips curve. We then describe in general terms the new Phillips curve, and 
briefly discuss the debate over this approach. 
2.1 The Traditional Phillips Curve 
The traditional Phillips curve relates inflation to some cyclical indicator plus lagged 
values of inflation. For example, let 1f't denote inflation and fit the log deviation of 
real GDP from its long run trend. A common specification of the traditional Phillips 
curve is: 
• 
'lrt = Ll{)i 7rt_i +0 Yt-l +Ct 
1=1 
(1) 
where €t is a random disturbance. Often the restriction is imposed that the sum of 
the weights on lagged inflation is unity, so that the model implies no long run trade­
off between output and inflation. Sometimes the equation includes additional lags of 
the output. Alternative specifications may use different cyclical indicators (e.g., the 
unemployment rate, capacity utilization, etc.) 
Despite considerable criticism, however, the traditional Phillips curve does a rea­
sonable job of characterizing post war inflation in the U.S. For example, Rudebusch 
and Svensson (1999, henceforth RS) show that a variant of equation (1) with four 
lags of inflation fits well quarterly U.S. data over the period 196(}.1999.' The output 
term enters significantly with a p05�tive sign and the sum of the coefficients on lagged 
inflation does not differ significantly from unity. 
Here we show that the traditional Phillips curve similarly appears to provide a 
reasonable description of inflation in the Euro area, over the available sample. To 
measure inflation we use the log difference of the GDP deflator. The output term is 
the log of real GDP, detrended with a fitted quadratic function of time. Estimates 
of the RS specification of equation (1) for quarterly Eure area data over the sample 
1970:1-1998:II yield: 
". = 0.520 ".-1 + 0.233 "._,- 0.070 ".-3+ 0.256 "._.+ 0.051 Y.-l + e. (0.081) (0.013) (0.084) (0.086) (0.016) 
For comparison, estimates of the model for U.S. data over the same sample yield: 
". = 0.602 ".-1+ 0.041 "._,+ 0.152 ".-3+ 0.155 "'_'+ 0.048 Y.-l +e. (0.041) (0.153) (0.119) (0.055) (0.014) 
Not only does the RS specification appear to work well for the Euro area, the esti­
mated coefficients are quite similar to those obtained for U.S. data. 
�See Stock and Watson (1999) for a more general analysis. In particular, the authors show 
that many real activity variables suggested in traditional Phillips curve analysis remain helpful in 
forecasting inflation. 
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Despite the apparent empirical success of the traditional Phillips curve, however, 
there are two basic concerns: The first, of course, is that the Lucas critique remains 
an issue, as it has been for the past the past twenty-five years. That is, the stability 
of this equation across policy regimes is unclear, particularly since the coefficients 
on lagged inflation may very well embed expectations of future inflation. This issue 
is particular concern in the Euro area, to the extent that the ECB signifies a brand 
new policy regime. The second basic concern involves the ability of the traditional 
Phillips curve to explain recent data. This concern is related to the first in the 
sense that it involves the stability of the relationship over time. In particular, in 
both the U.S. and Europe, inflation has been low despite high GDP levels relative to 
trend, owing to robust growth. As a result, traditional Phillips curve relations have 
been over-predicting inflation. Some observers have simply pronounced the death 
of the Phillips curve. Others have noted that by making some ex post adjustments 
(e.g., changing the measure of potential output, adjusting for certain types of supply 
shocks) it is possible to resurrect the basic relation.6 In either case, the lesson remains 
that an empirically based Phillips curve that does a reasonable job of aocounting for 
the past, need not continue to do well in the future. All this suggests that structural 
modeling of inflation is desirable, in the same way it is desirable for all other aspects 
of a macroeconomic framework. 
2.2 The New Phillips Curve 
The new Phillips curve is based on staggered nominal price setting, in the spirit of 
Taylor's (1980) seminal work. A key difference is that price setting behavior is the 
product of optimization by monopolistically competitive firms subject to constraints 
on the frequency of price adjustment. A popular example is based on Calvo's model 
(1983) of staggered price setting, which has the virtue of parsimony. Here we outline 
the key aspects, and defer some of the details relevant for an explicit derivation of an 
estimable relation to Section 3.1 below. 
The basic building block is the following equation that relates inflation "t to 
anticipated future inflation and real marginal cost: 
(2) 
where ffiCt is average real marginal cost, in percent deviation from its steady state 
level, /3 is a subjective discount factor, and A is a slope coefficient that depends on the 
primitive parameters of the model, particularly the parameter that governs the degree 
of price rigidity. Equation (2) is a log-linear approximation of a relation obtained from 
aggregating across the pricing decisions of individual firms.7 This relation is what 
6See, for example, the discussion in Gordon (1998) and Stock (1998). 
7 As we discuss in section 3, the new Phillips curve is obtained as loglinear approximation around 
a deterministic steady state inflation rate. The implicit assumption is that monetary policy is aimed 
at obtaining this steady state rate. Allowing for shifts in the steady state inflation rate would give 
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we referred to in the introduction as the "primitive formulation" of the new Phillips 
curve; Le., it is the formulation that arises directly as a consequence of the frictions 
in the price adjustment process that are the key aspect of the theory. 
What is most often seen in the literature, however, is the "standard formulation" of 
the new Phillips curve that instead relates inflation to an output gap variable. Under 
certain restrictions on technology and labor market structure (see, e.g., Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1997)), within a local neighborhood of the steady state real marginal 
costs are proportionately related to the output gap as follows, 
(3) 
where y, and y; are the logarithms of real output and the natural level of real output, 
respectively. Combining (2) with (3) then yields the standard output gap-based 
formulation of the new Phillips curve. 
(4) 
where" = ),6. 
It is equation (4) that has been the subject of considerable controversy. As with 
the traditional Phillips curve, inflation varies positively with the output gap. In 
contrast to the traditional Phillips curve, however, inflation is an entirely forward 
looking phenomenon. Iterating equation (4) forward yields: 
� 
7r, =" L (3k E'{(Y'+k - Y;+k)} (5) 
k=O 
A striking implication is the absence of a tradeoff between inflation and output; to 
the extent a central bank can commit to stabilizing the output gap (Yt+k - Y;+k), it 
can achieve prioe stability. However, as emphasized by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), GG 
and others, equation (5) is at odds with the data. It suggests that inflation should 
anticipate movements in the output gap.s Yet, as the estimates of the traditional 
Phillips curve suggest, the output gap (measured by detrended output) tends to lead 
inflation.' While this result is widely known to hold for U.S. data, our Phillips curve 
us more flexibility in fitting the data, but would raise the problem of trying to explain changes in 
the central bank's long run target inflation rate. 
8Mankiw (2000) has recently emphasized that equation (5) predicts that inflation should respond 
quickly to monetary policy shocks (since it anticipates the response of output), which is counterfac­
tual. Note, however, that this criticism does not extend to the marginal cost-based formulation of 
the new Phillips curve (equation (2)), to the extent marginal costs responds sluggishly to the policy 
shock, relative to output. 
9To see precisely the problem, note that assuming f3 :::::: 1, equation (4) may be expressed as 
follows: 
1I"t = 1I"t_l - K. (Yt-l - Y;-l) + tit 
with tit = 1I"t -Et_1 {1I"t}. Thus the theory implies that current inflation should be negatively related 
to the lagged output gap, in contrast to the evidence. 
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estimates in the previous section suggest that it applies equally well to the Euro area. 
Overall, the output-gap based formulation of the new Phillips curve cannot account 
for the persistence of inflation either for the U.S. or for the Buro area. 
M, we noted in the introduction, however, Sbordone (1999) and GG find that the 
central aspect of the theory, the relation between inflation and real marginal cost 
given by equation (2) is roughly consistent with the data (see footnote 4). These 
results suggest that it is equation (3), the hypothesized link between real marginal 
cost and the output gap, that is at variance with the data. GG present some direct 
evidenoe for U.S. data to show that this is indeed the case. Real marginal cost 
tends to respond sluggishly and with a lag to movements in the output gap, much 
as inflation does. There are two possible explanations for this finding. One is that 
conventional measures of the output gap may be poor. To the extent that there are 
significant real shocks to the economy (e.g. shifts in technology growth, fiscal shocks, 
etc.), using detrended output as a proxy for y; may not be appropriate. Whether 
this factor alone could account for the observed inertia in real marginal cost relative 
to detrended output is an open question, however. 
A second, and perhaps more likely possibility, is that even if the output gap is 
correctly measured, it may not be the case that real marginal cost moves proportion­
ately, as assumed. In particular, as we discuss in section 5, with frictions in the labor 
market, either, in the form of real or nominal wage rigidities, equation (3) is no longer 
valid. These labor market rigidities, further, can in principle offer a rationale for the 
inertial behavior of real marginal cost.lO Indeed, in section 5 we provide evidence that 
labor market frictions were an important factor in the dynamics of marginal cost for 
both the Euro area and the U.S., though with some important differences across the 
two regions. 
3 A Marginal Cost-Based Phillips Curve 
In this section we derive a structural relation between inflation and real marginal cost 
across firms that we estimate in the subsequent section. As in GG, we first present 
a baseline model. We then derive a hybrid model that allows for a fraction of firms 
to set prices using a backward looking rule of thumb. Here the idea is to test the 
baseline model explicitly against the alternative that arbitrary lags of inflation are 
required to explain inflation, as in the traditional Phillips curve analysis. 
One difference from GG is that we relax the assumption that firms face identical 
constant marginal costs (which greatly simplifies aggregation), and instead allow for 
increasing real marginal cost, following Woodford (1996) and Sbordone (1999). We 
choose this path because allowing marginal cost to vary across firms produces more 
plausible estimates of the degree of price rigidity in the Euro area. Our baseline 
10 As we discuss in section 5, further, inertial behavior of marginal cost opens up the possibility 
of a short run tradeoff between inflation and output. See also Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). 
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model, accordingly, is exactly the theoretical framework in Sbordone (1999). Our 
hybrid model is a generalization that extends GG to allow for increasing marginal 
cost. The appendix provides a detailed solution. 
3.1 The Baseline Model 
We assume a continUlUll of firms indexed by j E [0, 11. Each firm is a monopolistic 
competitor and produces a differentiated good Y,(j), that it sells at nominal price 
P,(j). Firm j faces an isoelastic demand curve for its product, given by Y,(j) = 
(�)-I!: tt. where Yt and Pt are aggregate output and the aggregate price level, 
respectively. Suppose also that the production function for firm j is given by Y(j), = 
A,N,(j)I-., where N,(j) is employment and A, is a conunon technological factor. 
Firms set nominal prices on a staggered basis, following the approach in Calvo 
(1983): Each firm resets its price only with probability 1 - 0 each period, indepen­
dently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure 
1 - B of producers reset their prices, while a fraction e keep their prices unchanged. 
Accordingly, the expected time a price remains fixed is 6. Thus, the parameter 
B provides a measure of the degree of price rigidity. It is one of the key structural 
parameters we seek to estimate. 
After appealing to the law large numbers and log-linearizing the price index around 
a zero inflation steady state, we obtain the following expression for the evolution of 
the (log) price level p, as function of (the log of) the newly set price p; and the lagged 
(log) price P'-l. 
PI = (1 - 0) P; + 0 PI-I (6) 
Because there are no firm-specific state variables, all firms that change price in pe­
riod t choose the same value of p;. A firm that is able to reset in t chooses price to max­
imize expected discounted profits given technology, factor prices and the constraint 
on price adjustment (defined by the reset probability 1 - 0). It is straightforward 
to show that an optimizing firm will set P; according to the following (approximate) 
log-linear rule: 
= 
p; = log i' + (1 - ,60) 2],60)' E.{mc;,'+kl (7) 
k=Q 
where {3 is a subjective discount factor, mc;'t+k is the logarithm of nominal marginal 
cost in period t + k of a firm that last reset its price in period t, and J.l == tI is 
the firm's desired gross markup. Intuitively, the firm sets price as a markup over a 
discounted stream of expected future nominal marginal cost. Note that in the limiting 
case of perfect price flexibility (0 = 0), p; = log i' + mc�: price is just a fixed markup 
over current marginal cost. Ail the degree of price rigidity (measured by 0) increases, 
-13-
so does the expect time the price is likely to remain fixed. As a consequence, the firm 
places more weight on expected future marginal costs in choosing current price. 
The goal now is to find an expression for inflation in terms of an observable 
measure of aggregate marginal cost. Cost minimization implies that the firm's real 
marginal cost will equal the real wage divided by the marginal product of labor. 
Given the Cobb-Douglas technology, the real marginal cost in t + k for a firm that 
optimally sets price in t, MCt,t+k, is given by: 
where Yt,t+k and Nt,t+k are output and employment for a firm that has set price in 
t at the optimal value P,". Individual firm marginal cost, of course, is not observable 
in the absence of firm level data. Accordingly it is helpful to define the observable 
variable "average" marginal cost, which depends only on aggregates, as follows:ll 
MG, = 
(W,fP,) 
- (1 - a)(Y,/N,) 
(8) 
Following Woodford (1996) and Sbordone (1999), we exploit the assumptions of 
a Cobb-Douglas production technology and the isoelastic demand curve introduced 
to obtain the following log-linear relation between MG'Mk and MG,: 
_ _  w(p" ) TnCt,t+k = mCt+k - -1 - t - Pt+k -0 (9) 
where niCt.t+k and 1Ti4+k are the log deviations of MCt,t+k and MCt+k from their 
respective steady state values. Intuitively, given the concave production function, 
firms that maintain a high relative price will face a lower marginal cost than the 
norm. In the limiting case of a linear technology (0 = 0), all firms will be facing a 
common marginal cost. 
We obtain the primitive formulation of the new Phillips curve that relates inflation 
to real marginal cost by combining equations (6), (7), and (9), 
with 
>. = (1 - 8)(1 - ,68)(1 - 0) - 8 [1+ a(e - I)J 
(10) 
(ll) 
Note that the slope coefficient>. depends on the primitive parameters of the model. 
In particular, A is decreasing in the degree of price rigidity, as measured by 0, the 
llNote that this measure allows for supply shocks (entering through At in the production). An 
adverse supply shock, for example, results in a decline in average labor productivity. Yd Nt. Also, 
the specificaton is robust to the addition of other variable factors (e.g. imported imports), so long 
as the elasticity of output with respect to labor is constant, firms take wages as given, and there are 
no labor adjustment costs. 
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fraction of firms that keep their prices constant. A smaller fraction of firms adjusting 
prices implies that inflation will be less sensitive to movements in marginal cost. 
Second, ). is also decreasing in the curvature of the production function, as measured 
by Ct, and in the elasticity of demand c. The larger Q: and c, the more sensitive is 
the marginal cost of an individual firm to deviations of its price from the average 
price level: everything else equal, a smaller adjustment in price is desirable in order 
to offset expected movements in average marginal costs. 
Finally, we observe that equation (10) can be expressed completely in terms of 
observables, since (8) implies that average real marginal costs correspond to real unit 
labor costs (or, equivalently, to the labor income share).12 In the end, accordingly, 
the model suggests that inflation should equal a discounted stream of expected future 
real unit labor costs. 
3.2 The Hybrid Model 
Equation (10) is the baseline relation for inflation that we estimate. An alternative 
to equation (10) is that inflation is principally a backward looking phenomenon, as 
suggested by the strong lagged dependence of this variable in traditional Phillips 
curve analysis. As a way to test the model against this alternative, we follow GG by 
considering a hybrid model that allows a fraction of firms to use a backward looking 
rule of thumb. Accordingly, a measure of the departure of the pure forward looking 
model from the data· in favor of the traditional approach is the estimate of the fraction 
of firms that are backward looking. 
All firms continue to reset price with probability 1 - O. However, only a fraction 
1 - w resets price optimally, as in the baseline Calvo model. The remaining fraction 
w choose the (log) price p� according to the simple backward looking rule of thumb: 
where pi-l is the average reset price in t - 1 (across both backward and forward 
looking firms). Backward looking firms see how firms set price last period and then 
make a correction for inflation, using lagged inflation as the predictor. Note that 
though the rule is not optimization based, it converges to the optimal rule in the 
steady state. 13 
In analogy to the baseline case, the only difference here from GG is that we 
relax the assumption of constant marginal cost across firms. We defer the details of 
the derivation to an appendix and simply report the resulting hybrid version of the 
marginal cost based Phillips curve: 
12In an earlier version of GG we showed that the results are robust to some alternative measures 
of marginal cost. See also Sbordone (1999). 
13Note also that backward looking firms free ride off of optimizing firms to the extent that P;-l is 
influenced by the behavior of forward looking firms. In this regard, the welfare losses from following 





(1 - w)(1 - 0)(1 - ;30)(1 - a) 
-
¢ [1 + a(E - 1)1 
where ¢ '" 0 + w[! - 0(1 - mi. 
(12) 
As in the pure forward looking baseline case, relaxing the assumption of constant 
marginal cost affects only the slope coefficient on average marginal cost. The coef­
ficients"/, and"/, are the same as in the hybrid model of GG. In this regard, note 
that the hybrid model nests the baseline model in the limiting case of no backward 
looking firms (Le., w = 0). Accordingly, if the baseline model is true, w should not 
differ significantly from zero. 
4 Evidence 
We next present estimates of both the baseline model (equation (10)) and the hybrid 
model (equation (12)) for the Euro area. For comparison, we also present results for 
the U.s. over the same sample period. 
All data are quarterly time series over the period 1970:1-1998:11. To measure in­
flation we use the GDP deflator. Figure 1 plots that variable, as well as detrended 
GDP. Our measure of average real marginal cost is the log of real unit labor costs, 
consistent the theory presented on section 3.1." Accordingly, we use the log deviation 
of real unit labor costs from its mean as a measure of TTiCt. 
Figure 2 displays our measure of real marginal cost together with inflation for 
the Euro area. Both variables move closely together, at least at medium frequencies. 
The relation appears to hold throughout the three key phases of the sample: (i) the 
high inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s; (ti) the disinflation of the early 1980s; 
and (iii) the current period of low inflation. IS , 16 This informal evidence provides 
HOur data for the Euro area are from from Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2000). Real unit labor 
costs are constructed as the ratio of compensation to employees (WIN) to GDP (YER). Inflation is 
measured as the quarterly percent change in the GDP deflator (YED). The data for the U.S. are 
described in GG. In particular, real unit labor costs are for the non-farm business sector. 
I�Blanchard (1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have also drawn attention to the rise and fall 
in the labor share in Europe over this time, which they interpret as reflecting shifts in the aggregate 
demand for labor. Also, Blanchard and Muet (1992) draw the connection between movements in the 
labor share and inflation for the French economy. We pursue this observation of strong co-movement 
of the labor share with inflation as a central implication of new Phillips curve theories. 
160ne possibilty, emphasized by Benabou (1992), is that inflation may be influencing movements 
in the labor share by affecting firms' desired markup. Our instrument variables procedure controls 
for this possibility of reverse causality in principle, though it is an issue we plan to investigate 
further. In the meantime, we observe that much of the movement in the labor share is associated 
with the wage markup as opposed to the price markup (see section 5.) Accordingly, the issue is 
whether inflation affects workers' desired markup. 
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some encouragement that inflation is related to movements in marginal costs along 
the lines that the theory suggestsP 
We now proceed to provide formal evidence of this conjecture. First, we present 
estimates of the model, including estimates of the key structural parameters. We 
then show that, while the baseline can be formally rejected against a hybrid model 
with some mild backward-Iookingness, is still does a good job at accounting for the 
dynamics of inflation in the Euro area. 
4.1 Baseline Model Estimates 
We begin by presenting estimates of the coefficients in equation (10). We refer to these 
estimates as "reduced form" since we do not try to identify the primitive parameters 
that underlie the slope coefficient A. We then proceed to the structural version of 
the model and, in particular, obtain an estimate of the key underlying primitive 
parameter 0, which governs the degree of price rigidity. 
4.1.1 Reduced Fbrm Estimates 
Our econometric procedure is relatively straightforward. Let Zt denote a vector of 
variables observed at time t. Then, under rational expectations, equation (10) defines 
the set of orthogonality conditions: 
E,{(", - (3 "1+1 -), mc.) z.} = 0 
Given these orthogonality conditions, we can estimate the model using generalized 
method of moments (GMM). 
We instruments dated t - 1 or earlier for two reasons: First, there is likely to be 
considerable error in our measure of marginal cost. Assuming this error is uncor­
related with past information, it is appropriate to use lagged instruments. Second, 
not all current information may be available to the public at the time they form 
expectations. 
For the Euro area estimates, our vector of instruments Zt includes five lags of 
inflation, and two lags of the real marginal cost, detrended output, and wage inflation. 
We choose a relatively small number of lags for instruments other than inflation in 
order to minimize the pot..ential estimation bias that is known to arise in small samples 
when there are too many overidentifying restrictions. We based the lag length for 
inflation on reduced form forecasting evidence. For the U.S. estimates, the instnunent 
t7We emphasize that the theory suggests that real marginal cost is effectively a measure of capacity 
utilization. Accordingly, underlying the persistent high inflation in the 1970s is overly accommoda­
tive central bank behavior. One possibility is that European central banks did not properly take 
into account reductions in potential output stemming from high wage increases. We expand on this 
in section 5. 
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set is the same, except that we only use four lags of inflation, again based on the 
reduced fonn evidence18. 
The estimated infiation equation for the Euro area is given by: 
1f, = 0.914 E,{ 1f,+d+ 0.088 me, (0.040) (0.041) 
(13) 
where standard errors are shown in parentheses. The corresponding equation for the 
U.S. is: 
1f, = 0.924 E,{1f'+l}+ 0.250 me. (0.029) (0.118) 
(14) 
In each instance, the standard errors are modified, using a Newey-West correction, 
given evidence of serial correlation in the error term, as we discuss below. 
We performed a number of diagnostic tests to evaluate these regressions. We begin 
with the. results for the Euro area. To check for potential weakness of the instruments, 
we perform an F-test applied to the first-stage regression; the results clearly suggest 
that the instruments used are relevant (F statistic = 61.8, with a p-value = 0.00)." 
Next we test the model's overidentifying restrictions. Based on the Hansen test, we do 
not reject the overidentifying restrictions (J statistic = 8.21, with associated p-value 
of 0.51). However, we consider a Ljung-Box test for residual autocorrelation and 
find that we reject the model's prediction of a martingale difference process for the 
error term (Q(4) = 24.8). We interpret that evidence as suggesting that the baseline 
Calvo specification does not fully capture all the dynamics present in the data. One 
possibly is that assumptions on the timing of price adjustment that eliminate history 
dependence (specifically an Li.d.probability of price adjustment) are too strong.'u 
However, we leave this consideration for future research. Another possibility is that 
there may be an element of backward looking price adjustment. We pursue this latter 
possibility in the next subsection. Finally, the diagnostic tests for the U.S. data yield 
results very similar to those obtained for the Euro area.21 
Overall, the empirical model works reasonably well in both cases. The slope 
coefficient on marginal cost is positive in each ease, as implied by the theory. The 
standard errors suggest some imprecision in the point estimate, but the coefficient in 
each case are significantly different from zero. The estimate of the discount factor is 
18 Adding a fifth lag of infiation to the instrument set does not affect the results. 
19Recentiy, Staiger and Stock (1997) point out the importance of examining this statistic, as 
conventional asymptotic results may break down under weak correlation between the instruments 
and the endogenous regressor. This is clearly not the case in our estimated equation. 
20The standard Taylor (1980) formulation of overlapping contracts generates additional serial 
correlation due to cohort effects. 
21 In the U.S. case the F-test applied u.. the first-stage regression yielded an F statistic of 42.6, 
with a p-value = 0.00. The Hansen test cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions (J statistic = 
5.76, with associated p-value of 0.67). The Ljung-Box test for residual autocorrelation also rejects 
the martingale difference null (Q(4) = 10.2, with p-value of 0.04). 
-18 -
a bit low, but is within the realm of reason, especially after taking into account the 
standard error. 
To illustrate that the COJUlection between inflation and real marginal cost is not 
simply a product of some kind of aggregation bias, we present evidence from country 
level annual data. Figure 3 plots GDP inflation versus marginal cost (again measured 
by the log labor share) for a number of OECD countries, including the member Euro 
countries, as the well the UK, Australia and the U.S. In virtually every case, there is 
a close movement between inflation and marginal cost, as the theory suggestS.22 
By way of contrast, when we estimate the model using detrended log GDP (as a 
proxy for the output gap, following other authors), the slope coefficient becomes the 
wrong sign: 
7r, = 0.990 E.{7r,+,}- 0.003 ii, (0.018) (0.007) 
and the corresponding equation for the U.S. yields the same conclusion: 
7r, = 1.012 E.{7r,+,}- 0.021 ii, (0.026) (0.006) 
(15) 
(16) 
Thus, our focus on real marginal cost in favor of conventional output gap measures 
appears justified. 
4.1.2 Structural Estimates 
We next estimate the structural parameter (J, which measures the extent of price 
rigidity. As equation (11) indicates, the reduced form coefficient>. is a function not 
only of 0 and {3, but also of the technology curvature parameter Q and the elasticity of 
demand e. The model's restrictions allow us to identify only two primitive parameters: 
{3, the slope coefficient on expected inflation in equation (10), as well as one other 
parameter among 8, 0, and c. Our strategy is to estimate 8 and p, conditional on a 
set of plausible values for Q and c. 
We obtain measures of Q and €, based on information about the steady values 
of the average markup of price over marginal cost, fJ.t and of the labor income share 
St == WtNt/ PtYt. By definition, the average markup equals the inverse of average 





We can accordingly pin down Q using estimates of steady state (sample mean) 
values of the labor income share and the markup. Given an estimate of the steady 
22In work in progress, Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2000) provide formal evidence of the nature of 
inflation dynamics for the main countries of the inflation area. See also Balakrishnan and Lopez.. 
Salido (2000) for U.K. evidence. 
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state markup p. we can obtain a value for c by observing that, given our assumptions, 
the steady state markup should correspond to the desired or frictionless markup, 
implying the relationship which allows us to identify e. 
e = _P­p - l  
We can now feed values of S and p in the two equations above to obtain measures 
of a and e. For the Euro area the average labor share is approximately 3/4 ; for the 
U.S. it is approximately 2/3.23 Unfortunately there is more controversy over the size 
of the average markup p.. Our baseline results are based on an average markup of 
1.1." 
We next define the constant { == l+�(�Q-l) E (0, 1), which is conditional on the 
calibrated values for Q and E. Given this definition, we can express the slope coefficient 
on real marginal cost, A in equation (10), as the following function of {: 
A '"  0-1(1 - 0)(1 - j30) {. 
In our baseline estimates below we treat { as known with certainty (conditional on 
the average labor income share and markup) which permits us to identify j3 and O. In 
addition we also report estimates under the assumption of constant returns to scale, 
which corresponds to � = 1. In the latter case identification of 0 does not require the 
calibration of any parameter. 
Before proceeding, note that the restrictions we impose to identify 0 are highly 
nonlinear (see equation (11)). As is well know, nonlinear estimation using GM:M is 
sometimes sensitive to the way the orthogonality conditions are imposed.25 For this 
reason, and following GG, we consider two alternative specifications of the orthogo­
nality conditions, which we refer to, respectively, as specifications 1 and 2: 
E,{(O 11', - 0j3 11',+1 - (1 - 0)(1 - j30){ me,) z,} = 0 
Ee{(1T, - j3 11" +1 - 0-1(1 - 0)(1 - j30){ mc.) z,} = 0 
Table 1 reports estimates of the baseline model for the Euro area, as well as the 
U.S .. For each region, we report estimates conditional on two different values of {, 
as di5(.ussed above. FUrther, in each instance we report estimates based on the two 
different specifications of the orthogonality conditions. The first two columns report 
23 Average labor shares for the Euro area were drawn European Economy (1999). The value for 
the U.S. was taken from Cooley and Prescott (1995). 
'''''An earlier version of the paper considered alternative values within the interval (1.1 ,1.4), a 
range of plausible estimates from the literature (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), Basu and 
Fernald (1997)}. None of the results were affected by that choice. 
2�See, e.g., Fuhrer, Moore, and Schuh (1995) for a discussion. 
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the estimates of the two primitive parameters, B and {3. The third column reports 
the implied estimate for A, the reduced form slope coefficient on real marginal cost. 
Next we report the average duration of a price (in quarters), corresponding to the 
estimate of B. Standard errors (with a Newey-West correction) for all the parameter 
estimates are reported in brackets. The final column displays Hansen's J statistic of 
the overidentifying restrictions, together with the associated J>'values (in brackets). 
The first two rows of Table 1 report the baseline estimates using Euro area data. 
All of them have the right sign and plausible size, and reasonably robust across the 
two normalizations. The estimated average duration of prices lies somewhere around 
three to four quarters. The estimate of the discount factor {3 is again a bit low, but 
not terribly so. Importantly, the implied value of ,X is positive and significant for 
both normalizations. Thus, the results suggest that real marginal cost is indeed a 
significant determinant of inflation, as the theory suggests. Finally, the estimates 
are fairly similar across specifications (1) and (2), though (1) tends to generate a 
somewhat lower estimate of the degree of price rigidity (and hence a higher estimate of 
the slope coefficient 'x). AB we suggested earlier, imposing the assumption of constant 
returns to labor yields an implausibly high estimate of the stickiness parameter and 
its implied duration. 
The estimates for the U.S are similar. If anything, they suggest that prioes are less 
rigid. The implied average duration of price rigidity is roughly two to three quarters 
in the baseline case, versus six to seven quarters in the case of constant returns to 
labor. It is interesting to notice that our estimates of the degree of price rigidity in 
the baseline case are very similar to Sbordone (1999), even though the estimation 
procedure is quite different. 
Again, the model's overidentifying restrictions are not rejected under any speci­
fication. However, this test is likely to have low power since it does not consider a 
specific alternative. We next report estimates for the hybrid model jntroduced above, 
whicb allows us to test directly against the hypothesis of backward looking inflation 
inertia. 
4.2 Hybrid Model Estimates 
We extend the approach described in the previous section to the estimation of the 
hybrid model (12). We continue to use real unit labor costs to measure the real mar­
ginal cost (up to a multiplicative factor). In this instance, we estimate an additional 
parameter: w, the fraction of backward looking price setters. As in the 'previous case, 
we use calibrated values of Ct and g to calibrate E. Now this allow us to identify w, 
as well as the price rigidity parameter B. 
Again we consider two alternative specifications of the orthogonality conditions. 
They are given by: 
E,{(<Inr, - ¢w 1f'_1 - ¢{3B 1f,+! - (1 - w)(l - B)(1 - {3B)� mc.) z,} = 0 
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and 
E,{(", - w "'-1 - (30 "'+l - q,-I(1 - w)(l - 0)(1 - (30)� iiiC,) Z,) = 0 
where parameter { is the same known function of (t and c used in the estimation of 
the pure forward-looking model, and where q, == 0 + wll - 0(1 - (3)I. 
The first three columns of Table 2 report estimates of the primitive parameters 
w, 0 and (3. The next three give the implied values of the reduced form parameters, 
"y" "Y I and ),. Again, we report the implied average duration of price rigidity, and the 
overidentifying restriction test. 
The estimates imply that backward looking price setting, measured by the size of 
w, has been a relatively Wlimportant factor behind the dynamics of Euro area infla­
tion. This is consistent with GG's evidence that forward looking behavior remained 
highly important for the U.S. If anything, however, backward looking behavior is 
less important in the Euro area. Under, specification I, the estimate of w, the frac­
tion of backward looking price-setters does not differ significantly from zero. Under 
specification 2, the fraction rises to somewhere between � and ! .  The estimates are 
statistically significant, but still quantitatively small, suggesting that forward look­
ing behavior is dominant in shaping the dynamics of inflation. The estimates of the 
other structural parameters, !3 and e are plausible and very close to their values for 
the forward looking case. Again, after accounting for standard errors, the estimates 
appear reasonably robust across the two different specifications of the orthogonality 
conditions.26 
Once again, the U.S. estimates look broadly similar to those for the Euro area, 
with prices appearing to be more flexible (Le., the average duration of price rigidity is 
shorter) in the former. Backward looking behavior is statistically significant, though 
quantitatively small: the estimates of w, which range from ! to � are slightly higher 
than in the Euro area. Notice that allowing for decreasing returns to labor yields lower 
estimates of both the degree of price rigidity and the fraction of backward looking price 
setters than those obtained under the constant returns assumption (corresponding to 
� = I). 
We have thus far tested our forward looking model against the hypothesis that 
inflation lagged one quarter also matters.27 One possibility, accordingly, is that "We 
may have biased our test against finding backwardness by not letting additional lags 
of inflation directly enter our Phillips curve. To examine this possibility, we added 
several lags of inflation to the hybrid model. Table 3 presents the results for the 
baseline model with J1. = 1.1 .  Parameter ?jJ denotes the sum of the coefficients on the 
26We also detected serial correlation of the error term in the hybrid model, and accordingly 
adjusted the standard errors. Note that the hybrid model does not necessarily predict a serial 
uncorrelated error term, since some of the error could be due to backward looking price setting (i.e., 
the error term in this case is not just a forecast error.) 
27Recall that due to the form of backward looking price setting we permit, price setters look back 
just one period to adjust current prices. 
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additional lags. Note that for both the Euro area and the U.S., this sum is small 
and not statistically significant". This result holds across all specifications. Thus, it 
appears that the structural marginal cost based model can account for the inflation 
dynamics with relatively little reliance on arbitrary lags of inflation, as compared to 
the traditional Phillips curve (see section 2). 
4.3 Actual versus Fundamental Inflation 
Next we propose, following GG and Sbordone (1999), an informal, but intuitive, way 
to assess the extent to which OUf model constitutes a good approximation to the 
dynamics of inflation in the Eura area.29 We consider only the pure forward looking 
baseline model given by equation (10), since the hybrid model does not yield estimates 
that are appreciably different. 
We next define the concept fundamental inflation 'IT; I which we obtain by iterating 
equation (10): 
� 
7rt = >' :L  fl' E,{mc.+k} := 7r; (17) 
k=O 
FUndamental inflation 1r; is a discounted stream of expected future real marginal 
costs, in analogy to the way a fundamental stock price is a discounted stream of 
expected future dividends. To the extent our baseline model is correct, fundamental 
inflation should closely mirror the dynamics of actual inflation. 
Since expectations of future marginal costs are not observable we cannot construct 
a direct measure of 7r;. Yet, under the maintained hypothesis that the model holds, 
we can construct an estimate of the right hand side of (17) as follows. Let 
[- - - ]' Zt = TTlCt, mCt_l, .. " 1'7tCt-q, 1Tt. 7T't-l, ... , 7rt_q 
for some finite q represent a restricted information set observable to the econometri­
cian. Given that trt E Zt it follows from (17) is that: 
� 
7r; = >. :L  fl' E,{mc.+k I z,} (18) 
k=O 
Let A denote the companion matrix of the VAR(I) representation for Zt. Accord­
ingly, Etfmct+k I Zt} = e'lAkzt• where el is a vector with a 1 in its first position and 
zeros elsewhere. If the model is correct we have 
7r; = >. e; (1 - flAt' z, 
28For the Euro area, some of the individual lag coefficients were statistically significant, though 
not large quantitatively. 
29The test is in the spirit of Campbell and Shiller (1987). 
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Hence, we can construct a measure of fundamental inflation using estimates of A, 
[3, as well as an estimate of A. Strictly speaking, this constructed measure should 
coincide with actual inflation (except for sampling error) if (17) is the true model of 
inflation. ·Of course, we cannot realistically expect (17) to hold exactly since it is, 
at best, ai good first approximation to reality. The question is then: to what extent 
observed fluctuations in inflation can be acCOW1ted for by our measure of fundamental 
inflation, Le., how far is our model from reality? 
Figure 4 displays our measure of fundamental inflation for the Euro area together 
with actual inflation. The measure of fundamental inflation is constructed using the 
estimated reduced form equation for the Euro area, given by equation (13). Virtually 
identical results obtain from using either of the estimated structural equations (speci­
fication (1) and (2)) in Table 1. Overall, fundamental inflation tracks the behavior of 
actual inflation quite well, especially at medium frequencies.ao In particular, it seems 
to succeed in accoW1ting for the rise of inflation in the mid 70s and the subsequent 
disinflation in the mid 19805, as well as the current environment of low inflation in 
spite of high growth. 
5 The Cyclical Behavior of Real Marginal Cost: 
The Role of Labor Market Frictions 
In this section we present a simple decomposition of the movement in real marginal 
cost in order to isolate the factors that drive this variable. Our results suggest that 
labor market frictions likely played a key role in the evolution of real marginal cost 
in both the Euro area and the U.S., though in a somewhat different fashion across 
the two regions. In this vein, the results suggest that labor market frictions may help 
explain inflation persistence in both cases.31 
Our decomposition requires some restrictions from theory. Suppose the repre­
sentative household has preferences given by L�o f3'U(C" N,), where U(C" N,) is 
separable in consumption Ct and labor Nt, and where usual properties are assumed 
to hold. Without taking a stand on the nature of the labor market (e.g. competi­
tive versus non-competitive, etc.), we can without loss of generality express the link 
between the real wage and household preferences as follows: 
Wt UN,t 10 
- = --- Jt, Pt UC,t 
(19) 
where _......;..:...I.U
UN I is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor. Be-c.' 
:lOGal and Gertler (1999) obtain a similar finding for the US, using the estimated hybrid model. 
Sbordone (1999) also finds that inflation is well explained by a discounted stream of future real 
marginal costs, though using a quite different methodology to parameterize the model. 
3lChristiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) also emphasize the need to consider labor market 
frictions in this kind of framework. Here we provide some direct evidence in favor of this conjecture. 
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cause that variable is the marginal cost to the household of supplying additional labor 
(in oonsumption units), the variable I"tw is interpretable as the gross wage markup (in 
analogy to the gross price markup over marginal cost, I"t). Assuming that the house­
hold cannot be forced to supply labor to the point where the marginal benefit *. 
exceeds the marginal cost -:;Nt I we have J1.i ;::: 1. c.' 
Conditional on measures of W and -(jN t I equation (19) provides a simple way to I C,! 
identify the role of labor market frictions in the wage component of marginal cost. 
If the labor market were perfectly competitive and frictionless (and there were no 
measurement problemsL then we should expect to observe J.L':: = 1, i.e., the real 
wage adjusts to equal the household's true marginal oost of supplying labor. With 
labor market frictions present, we should expect to see I't > 1 and also possibly 
varying over time. Situations that could produce this outcome include: households' 
having some form of monopoly power in the labor market, nominal wage rigidities, 
distortionary taxes on labor income, etc. 
Using equation (19) to eliminate the real wage in the measure of real marginal 




(1 - a)(Y.jN,) 
UN,jUC ' •. . 
• p.-(1 - a)Y.jN, ' 
(20) 
According to equation (20), real marginal oost is the product of two components (i) 
the wage markup p.�and (ii) the ratio of the household's marginal cost of labor supply 
to the marginal product of labor, 0�:;?��:' We refer to this latter component as the 
"inefficiency wedge," since it is a proportionate measure of output relative to the 
efficient level of output, .i.e., the one corresponding to the frictionless competitive 
equilibrium. In general, the inefficiency wedge is unity when output is at potential, 
and declines monotonically with the ratio of output to potential.32 For our purposes, 
the key point is that absent frictions in the labor market, real marginal cost equals the 
inefficiency wedge, and thus varies positively with output relative to potential. With 
labor market frictions, however, marginal cost also depends on the wage markup, 
opening up a possible of source of inertia. 
Assume that U(Ct, Nt) = log Ct - l;'",Nt
l+"" implying UC,t = t and UN,t = -Nt. 
Log-linearizing equation (20) and ignoring constants, yields an expression for marginal 
cost and its components that is linear in observable variables: 
TTICt = log p.'( + [(c, + <p n,) - (y, - n,)] (21) 
with 
logp.;" = (w, - p,) - (Ot + <p n,) 
J2To see, note that when output equals potential, marginal product of labor equals the marginal 
cost of labor supply, implying that the efficiency wedge is unity. Output below potential means 
(1 - cx)Y,.JNt > -UN.t/UC,t, implying that the inefficiency wedge is less than unity. 
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where lower case variables are used to denote logarithms. The expression [(c. +<pn,) ­
(y, - n,») is the log linearized inefficiency wedge, with (c. + <pn,) being the marginal 
cost of labor supply. The parameter, 'P, further, is the inverse of the elasticity of 
labor supply. 
Before proceeding with the decomposition, it is useful to make precise the implica­
tions of the wage markup for inflation dynamics. For simplicity, consider an economy 
"with just consumption goods, so that Ct = Yt. In this instance, the inefficiency wedge 
is related to the output gap according to: 
(c. + 4mt) - (y, - n,) = -6 + 6 (y, - yn 
where y; is the now the level of output that would obtain with flexible prices and 
wages, and 6 == log /,W + log /' is an index of the steady state distortion associated 
with the existence of market power in both labor and goods markets. It follows from 
equation (21) that in this case real marginal cost is given by: 
where Ii� == log {I':' /I'W) is the percent deviation of the wage markup from its steady 
state level. We can combine this expression for real marginal cost with the new 
Phillips curve given by equation (10) to obtain 
(22) 
with I< = >'6. Equation (22) makes clear that the standard formulation of the new 
Phillips curve based on the output gap is correct only under the assumption of con­
stant wage markups (i.e., Ii� = 0). 
To see the impact on inflation dynamics, iterate equation (22) forward to obtain 
� 
1f, = L i3" E,{>' Ii':'.  + I< (Y'+k - Y;+k)} 
k=O 
In this instance, inflation depends not only on the expected path of the output gap, 
but also on the fluctuations in the wage markup. Suppose for example that real 
wages are sticky, either due to some form of real rigidity, or nominal wage rigidity in 
conjunction with nominal price rigidities (as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin, (2ooo» . 
Suppose further that there is a decline in the output gap, possibly expected to persist 
for some time. The real wage rigidity will produce a persistent rise in the wage 
markup, since the output gap {and hence the inefficiency wedge (c. + <pn,) - (y, -n,» 
decline relative to the wage. As a consequence, the expected path of real marginal 
cost and thus inflation decline less than they would relative to case of a frictionless 
labor market. In this way, labor market frictions may help account for the observed 
inertia real marginal costs and inflation. 
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We now proceed to deoompose (log) real marginal cost into the sum of the (log) 
wage markup and (log) inefficiency wedge. As is apparent from equation (21), to 
identify the two components VIe need information on non-durable consumption per 
household, Ct, and employment per household n" as well as two variables we used 
earlier: the real wage (w. -pol and average labor productivity (Y. - n,). For the Euro 
area, only total consumption is available; however, experimenting with U.S. data 
suggest that the results are reasonably robust to using total consumption instead of 
just nondurable. To measure employment per household, we use the log difference 
between employment and the labor force. Hours are not available, but experimenta­
tion with the U.S. data suggests that the results are robust also to this modification. 
Finally, take as unity our benciunark measure of labor supply elasticity, implying 
<p = 1. The results are robust to variations in labor supply elasticities within a rea­
sonable neighborhood of unity, and also to allowing for nonseparability of preferences 
over consumption and leisure. 
Figures 5 and 6 present the decompositions for the Euro area and for the U.s., 
respectively. The top panel in each case illustrates the behavior of the (log) ineffi­
ciency wedge relative (log) real marginal cost and the bottom panel does the same 
for the (log) wage markup. 
For the Euro area, perhaps most striking is the apparent secular upward drift in 
the wage markup from 1970 to early 1982. This behavior seems consistent with the 
popular notion that labor union pressures produced a steady rise in the real wage 
over this era. The impact of this labor market distortion is mirrored in the steady 
decline in the inefficiency wedge over the entire period, which is especially apparent 
from comparing the pre-1982 and post-1982 behavior of this variable. This decline is 
most likely associated with rising employment (i.e. rising unemployment reduces our 
measure of Tlt, which everything else equal, reduces (Ct + <,Ont), the nwnerator in the 
inefficiency wedge.) 
At the medium run frequency, accordingly, the evolution of marginal cost (our 
metric for inflationary pressures) in Europe goes as follows: In the early 1970s the 
economy is operating near full capacity, as measured by the high inefficiency wedge.'" 
Inflationary pressures are low, however, due to a low wage markup. Over the period, 
however, the steady rise in the wage markup produces an overall rise in marginal cost. 
In the latter half of the sample, however, the wage markup moderates, but a persistent 
decline in the inefficiency wedge associated with employment stagnation leads to low 
overall marginal cost, and thus low inflationary pressures. We stress, though, that our 
sample ends in 1998. Since this time there has been a decline in unemployment and 
a rise in output growth in the Ellio area, without any corresponding rise in inflation. 
JJWe stress that the inefficiency wedge is a measure of capacity utilization and not capacity output, 
i.e., Figure 5 simply suggests that capacity utilization was high in the 1970s. Indeed, supply shocks 
in the 1970s, including wage pressures as well as oil shocks, likely had an adverse effect on capacity 
output. A likely scenario is that European central banks did not properly adjust monetary policy 
to account for the contraction in ca.pacity output resulting from these shocks. 
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In the context of our analysis, either a declining wage markup or rising productivity 
(the new economy reaches Europe?), or some combination of the two could be at 
work. We look forward to sorting this out in future research. 
To be sure, it is likely that cyclical as well as secular forces influenced the joint 
dynamics of the wage markup and the inefficiency wedge in the Euro area. The sharp 
drop in the inefficiency wedge during the 1980s is likely a result of the severe recession 
in Europe at this time. The corresponding sharp rise in the wage markup during the 
severe downturn of the early 1980s is best explained by wage rigidity. The rise in 
the wage markup over this period accounts why marginal cost (and hence inflation), 
responded sluggishly to the recession. 
Finally, for the U.S. it appears that mainly cyclical forces have been at work. The 
inefficiency wedge is closely correlated with the business cycle. The wage markup 
appears to move inversely with the inefficiency wedge, again suggesting the likelihood 
of temporary wage rigidity. Accordingly, for the U.S, temporary wage rigidities may 
provide a way to explain the sluggish response of marginal cost and inflation to cyclical 
output movements. 
One somewhat surprising result for the U.S. is that our decomposition suggests 
that the moderate behavior of real marginal cost in recent years has been mainly the 
result of a declining wage markUp. Indeed the decline in the wage markup has more 
than offset a sharp rise in the inefficiency wedge. Indeed, the latter has risen in recent 
years, despite the rise in labor productivity. Rapid growth in nondurable consumption 
and labor force participation in the U.S. appears responsible. (i.e. (o.+<pn,) -(y, -11,) 
has risen despite the rise in y, - n, since 0. as well as n, has risen rapidly.) One 
possibility is that our simple measure of the households' marginal cost of supplying 
labor, (Ct + cpn,.), is suspect. Beyond the issue of parfu'Iletric assumptions, there may 
be aggregation problems. To the extent, for example, it has been concentrated among 
the wealthy and or retirees, the recent rapid growth in nondurable consumption may 
not be a good proxy for the movement in a representative worker's marginal utility. 
Also, our measure of labor force participation does not adjust for demographic factors, 
as recently emphasized by Shimer (1998). On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence 
does suggest an easing of wage pressures in the U.S., so the notion of a decline 
in the wage markup is not unreasonable. In future work we plan to explore these 
measurement issues in more detail, as well as alternative parametric assumptions. 
6 Conclusions 
Our results suggest that a marginal cost - based new Phillips curve provides a good 
description of Euro area inflation over the period 1970-1998. The empirical model 
appears to capture the high inflation of the 1970s, the disinflation of the 1980s, as 
well as the current environment of low inflation. 
As with the U.S., sluggish movement in marginal cost appears to be an important 
factor accounting for observed high degree of persistence in inflation. Our decom-
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position of marginal cost suggests that labor market frictions, as manifested in the 
behavior of the wage markup, may be critical to dynamics of this variable. In both 
the Euro area and the U.S. there is a countercyclical element to the behavior of the 
wage markup, consistent with the presence of wage rigidities. A distinctive feature 
of the Euro area, however, is an upward drift of the wage markup in the 19705, con­
sistent with the anecdotal evidence for wage pressures in Europe. For one reason or 
another, European central banks at this time did not properly adjust for the impact 
of the rise in the wage markup (and other adverse supply shocks) on the natural level 
of output, which helps account for the persistent high inflation of this era. 
Understanding the determinants of the wage markup appears to be the critical 
next step. It is possible that the staggered nominal wage (and price) contracting 
model of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) might account for the high frequency 
behavior of this markup. Under this approach, the ex post wage markup adjusts 
countercyclically for essentially the same reason the baseline sticky price model pro­
duces an countercyclical price markup (given a constant desired markup). The sticky 
nominal wage model, however, is unlikely to provide a full explanation for the Euro 
area data since it would have difficulty accounting for medium term dynamics of the 
wage markup, particularly the rise in the 1970s. Here a model of real rigidities (e.g. 
union pressures, etc.) that accounts for variation in the desired wage markup would 





B i3 A D J 
Euro Area 
I" = 1.1 , " = 0.32 
(1) 0.669 0.805 0.228 3.0 9.081 
(0.026) (O.OSI) (0.052) (0.08) (0.430) 
(2) 0.771 0.914 0.088 4.4 8.213 
(0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.19) (0.513) 
� = 1  
(1) 0.904 0.886 0.021 10.4 8.506 
(0.011) (0.042) (0.001) (0.12) (0.484) 
(2) 0.918 0.914 0.014 12.2 8.214 
(0.015) (0.040) (0.006) (0.18) (0.513) 
United States 
1" = 1.1 , ,, = 0.40 
(1) 0.475 0.837 0.665 2.0 7.681 
(0.060) (0.053) (0.238) (0.11) (0.465) 
(2) 0.627 0.924 0.250 2.7 5.759 
(0.067) (0.029) (0.114) (0.18) (0.674) 
� = 1  
(1) 0.845 0.910 0.042 6.4 5.845 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.015) (0.17) (0.665) 
(2) 0.867 0.924 0.031 7.5 5.760 (O.o3a) (0.029) (0.014) (0.23) (0.674) 
Note: The parameter a: was calibrated so (I-a) is equal to the average labor income 
share divided by the chosen markup (J.L). The average labor income shares are taken to 
be equal to 2/3 for the US and 3/4 for the Euro Area. Sample Period: 197()'1998. The 
column D corresponds to the associated. sticky prices duration, and J to the Hansen test 
of the overidentifying restrictions (below in brackets we report the p-value). Instruments 
for Eura area: inflation t-l to t-5, output gap, labor income share and wage inflation: 





w 0 {3 "fb "f A D J 
Euro Area 
I' = 1.1 , cr = 0.32 
(1) 0.030 0.668 0.804 0.043 0.773 0.214 3.0 8.983 
(0.083) (O.O29) (O.OS6) (0.115) (0,064) (0.079) (0.09) (O.J4") 
(2) 0.287 0.787 0.925 0.272 0.689 0.039 4.7 7.484 
(0.126) (0.089) (0.069) (0.072) (0.047) (0.049) (0.42) (0.380) 
{ = 1  
(1) 0.024 0.907 0.897 0.025 0.877 0.018 10.0 8.428 
(0.122) (0.015) (0.053) (0.127) (0.045) (0.012) (0.14) (0.393) 
(2) 0.335 0.922 0.920 0.272 0.689 0.006 12.8 7.485 
(0.129) (0.031) (0.074) (0.072) (0.044) (0.007) (0.40) (0.380) 
United States 
I' = 1.1 , cr = 0.40 
(1 ) 0.255 0.498 0.863 0.347 0.584 0.291 2.0 4.993 
(0.054) (0.072) (O.OM) (0.045) (0.064) (0.139) (0.14) (0.661) 
(2) 0.317 0.569 0.916 0.384 0.599 0.162 2.3 4.216 
(0.065) (0.080) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.093) (0.19) (O.764,) 
{ = 1 
(1) 0.400 0.818 0.878 0.339 0.610 0.026 5.5 4.332 (0.074) (0.038) (0.052) (0.0046) (0.034) (0.013) (0.21) (0.741) 
(2) 0.451 0.827 0.898 0.364 0.599 0.020 5.8 4.216 
(0.075) (0.042) (0.052) (0.042) (0.032) (0.011) (0.24) (O.7M) 
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Table 3 
Hybrid Model: Further Inflation Lags 
Parameters Test 
w 8 f3 'Yb 'Y >. D J 
Euro Area 
(1) 0.105 0.669 0.847 0.138 0.742 0.168 -0.037 3.0 6.566 (0.074) (0.083) (0.059) (0.084) (0.049) (O.09!i) (0.093) (0.25) (0.087) 
(2) 0.183 0.811 0.863 0.188 0.719 0.048 0.049 5.3 5.928 
(0.101) (0.137) (0.069) (0.083) (0.043) (0.062) (O.O77) (0.72) (0.115) 
United States 
(1) 0.265 0.563 0.870 0.328 0.606 0.203 0.044 2.2 2.011 
(0.094) (0.111) (0.125) (0.089) (0.066) (0.135) (0.066) (0.25) (0.570) 
(2) 0.290 0.598 0.899 0.333 0.617 0.151 0.038 2.5 1.566 
(0.103) (0.122) (0.128) (0.088) (O.OM) (0.116) (0.065) (0.30) (0.815) 
Note: The estimates correspond to the model under decreasing returns to labor. 
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Figure 1 .  Inflation and Output in the Euro area 
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Figure 3a. Inflation and Marginal Cost In OECD countries 
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Figure 3b. Inflation and Marginal Cost in OECD countries 
Inflation (continuous line) and Marginal Cost (dotted line) 
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Figure 4. Fundamental Inflation in the Euro area 12.8 1 - .-- - - - - -- --- ---. ���-. 
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Figure 5.Components of the Marginal Cost in the Euro area 
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7 Appendix: Derivation of the Hybrid Phillips 
Curve with Increasing Marginal Cost 
The log-linearized equations of the model with backward-looking firms are given by: 
price index Pt: 
p, = 8 Pt-l + (1 - 8) p; 
index of newly fe-set prices p;: 
p; = (1 - w) II. + (1 - 8) p: 
forward looking re-set price p{ : 
� 
II. = (1 - {38) 2:({38)' E,{mc.,'H + p,+d 
'=0 
marginal cost of forward looking firms that re-set price at t, mc.,'H: 
_ _ EO ,J 





where 1fiCt+k is the percent deviation from steady state of average real marginal cost 
Me = (wt/Pt) t - (1 o) (YdNt) · 
Backward looking re-set price 
where 1I't == Pe - Pt-I-
Rearranging equations (23) and (24) yields 
Jr, = C � 8) (p; - p,) 
= C � 0) [(1 - w) (p{ - p,) + w (p: - p,)] 
(27) 
(28) 
We next obtain expressions for (p{ - p,) and (Jf. - p,). Let Jr','H '" P'H - p,. 
Combining (25) and (26) yields 
II. - p, 
� � 
(1 - {30) � 2:({30)' Et{mc.+.} + 2:({30)' E,{Jr,+d (29) 
- 40 -
h . h < - � w ere, as In t e text, ." = l+a(e-l} ' 
Combining (23) with (27) yields 
b 1 P - Pt = 1 _ f) 71'"t_l - 1ft (30) 
Next, insert (29) and (30) into (28) to obtain the following expression for inflation: 
7ft = C � 0 ) [w ( 1 � 07ft-1 - 7ft) + (1 - w)[(1 - (30)� E((30)k Et{mc.+d + t,((30)'Et{7ft+dl] (31) 





with '" '= 0 + w[1 - 0(1 - (3)1. 




Notice that in the absence of backward looking price setting (w = 0) equation 
(32) becomes the pure forward looking marginal cost based Phillips with increasing 
marginal cost, as derived by Sbordone (1999). Under the assumption of a constant 
marginal cost (" = 0) the model becomes the hybrid Phillips curve derived in Gali 
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